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Abstract: We examined whether Brazil’s educational spending on public primary schools 
resulted in better quality of education, 2003-2009. Our hypothesis was municipalities that 
received higher government spending on primary education had higher students’ tests 
scores. We used a panel analysis with fixed effects, including a simulated instrumental 
variable to control for endogeneity. Even though the magnitude of all significant estimated 
coefficients increased, when controlling for endogeneity, they were still very small. Findings 
proved that the relationship between quality of education and educational spending was 
not optimal, weakly contributing to the increase in test scores. 
1. Introduction
Quality of education is a key ingredient towards economic growth, so not surprisingly, many 
countries across the globe are investing in education. Various approaches have demonstrated how 
education may affect economic growth. First, some scholars empirically showed that education fostered 
human capital, which increased labour productivity, and as a consequence, moved economic growth to a 
higher level (Fleisher, Hu, Li, & Kim 2011; Lucas, 1988; Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992; Oketch, 2006; 
Teixeira & Fortura, 2004). Second, various studies indicated that education boosted both innovation 
capacity and new knowledge about technology, products, and processes leading to growth (Aghion & 
Howitt, 1998; Benhabib & Spiegel, 2005; Lucas, 1988; Nelson & Phelps, 1966; Park, Choung, & Min 2008; 
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Ranis, Stewart & Ramirez 2000; Wolff 2000). Third, the fact that education can facilitate spillovers of 
knowledge and promote skill based technical changes (Fleisher & Hu Lu Kim, 2011) is well-documented 
(Acemoglu 1996, 1998; Ciccone & Peri, 2006).  
Increasing trends of public investment in education emphasise the need to better understand the 
relationship between quality of education and public resource allocation for education. Empirical studies 
have demonstrated mixed results: some studies have indicated a positive relationship between student 
performance and investments in education (Castelló-Climent & Hidalgo-Cabrillana, 2012; Manuelli & 
Seshadri 2006); other studies have indicated little impact of investments on performance or no 
relationship between the two (Hanushek, 2001, 2005; Hanushek & Kimko, 2000).  
Investments in education have been a priority in Brazil since the early 2000s. The national public 
educational and cultural expenditures increased 27 percent from 2006 to 2010 (Ministry of Finance, 
2015). Within this context, the main objective of this paper is to examine whether Brazil’s educational 
spending on public primary schools during the period 2003-2009 resulted in better quality of education. 
Prova Brasil, a national test administered by the Brazilian Ministry of Education, is the dependent variable, 
used as a proxy for measuring quality of education. Higher average scores in Prova Brasil indicate better 
quality of education. The independent variable of interest is the Fundo de Desenvolvimento do Ensino 
Fundamental e da Valorização do Magistério (Fundef), a federal fund which had as its aim the 
redistribution of state and municipal resources back to municipalities according to student enrolment 
(Koppensteiner, 2014). Our hypothesis is that municipalities that received higher government spending 
on primary education had higher Prova Brasil scores.    
We used panel data analysis with school fixed effects to estimate the impact of educational 
spending on the quality of education; school clusters were also included in the estimations. Two grades 
and two subjects are used as dependent variables, allowing four different measures of quality of 
education: ‘math grade 4,’ ‘math grade 8,’ ‘Portuguese grade 4,’ and ‘Portuguese grade 8.’ Additionally, 
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our panel regression models include a simulated instrumental variable to deal with endogeneity bias due 
to potential municipal behaviour. The instrumental variable was simulated based on Kosec’s (2014) 
approach, using data prior to Fundef to predict municipal revenue in a given year. Only pre law (that is, 
prior to Fundef) municipal responses are included in the instrumental variable.  In other words, by using 
the simulated instrumental variable we are able to capture the impact of public spending on test scores 
based on exogenous changes in the Fundef law, not on municipal behaviour. 
The findings of the estimations with the simulated instrumental variable indicate that three out 
of the four estimated regressions support the hypothesis. In these estimations, the coefficients for the 
independent variables of interest (that is, educational spending) increase in magnitude when compared 
to the models that did not control for endogeneity. The magnitude of these coefficients was small, 
however, showing that education spending has little impact on test scores.  
Our contribution to the literature is based on our methodology. We examine an issue already 
explored by other scholars, but with a more accurate identification strategy, in which fixed effects were 
combined with a simulated instrumental variable. Even though we follow Kosec (2014), our objective is 
different from hers. She uses education as an example to understand “what drives governments with 
similar revenues to publicly provide very different amounts of goods with private sector substitutes”(p. 
320); whereas, we sought to examine the relationship between educational spending and quality of 
education.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section two gives a background about the Brazilian socio-
economic context. Section three introduces the Fundef law. Section four presents a literature review. The 
fifth section describes the variables used in this study and explains the methodology. The sixth section 
presents both the estimation results and a discussion about them. The final section contains concluding 
remarks, limitations of the study, and ideas for future research. 
2. BACKGROUND 
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During the first decade of the 2000s, Brazil was in the headlines of international media because 
of its high economic growth rate and its investments in social development. In the context of the global 
economy, Brazil was growing at a faster rate than most other countries. This growth was attracting 
investors and new businesses to Brazil’s territory. Additionally, under President Lula’s leadership (2003-
2011), social investments were a priority, allowing many Brazilians who were living in poverty to have 
access to a better quality of life. The poverty rate in Brazil rose to 22.4 per cent in 2004, but has sharply 
declined since then to 13.3 per cent in 2009 and 8.9 per cent in 2013 (World Bank, 2015). The population 
earning less than the Purchasing Power Parity of $1.25 per day followed a similar pattern, rising to 11.2 
per cent in 2003 but falling to 4.7 per cent in 2009, followed by a very slight decline to 3.8 per cent in 2012 
(World Bank, 2015). 
When comparing Brazil to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries, according to OECD (2012), “Brazil [boasted] one of the largest increases in expenditure in 
education between 2000 and 2009 among the countries for which data was available”(p. 3). Moreover, 
from 2006 to 2010, the southeast region, the richest region of the country, had an increase of nine per 
cent of public educational and cultural expenditures (Ministry of Finance, 2015). On the other hand, the 
northeast region, the poorest region in Brazil, had an increase of 43 per cent, indicating that public 
resources were being allocated where they needed them the most. In addition to these statistics, the 
mixed findings reviewed above, bring to light the need to better understand the relationship between 
quality of education and public resource allocation for education.     
It is important to place the Brazilian case in context with other Latin American countries to 
understand where it stands with regards to economic growth, quality of education, and educational 
spending. Table 1 compares these factors among five Latin American countries, who were selected 
because they spent the greatest percentage of GDP on education during the period of study. Economic 
growth is measured by GDP annual percentage growth, quality of education is measured by the Program 
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for International Student Assessment (PISA), and educational spending is measured by the annual 
percentage of GDP that is allocated to education.  
As Table 1 shows, Brazil had the highest GDP per cent allocated to education in all years. On the 
other hand, Brazil had the lowest PISA math for 2006, and the second lowest for 2009. Brazil had only 
average PISA reading values for both years. Since economic growth goes hand in hand with investments 
in human capital, and these statistics show that public spending on education steadily increased in Brazil, 
one would expect Brazil to have higher PISA values. However, this does not seem to be the case here, and 
therefore, attention to ensuring that effective investments are being made for high quality education for 
students in Brazil is imperative. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Finally, according to IPEA (2016) the percentage of five and six year old children attending school 
increased by approximately 15 per cent between 2003 and 2014. These statistics are interpreted as 
positive signs because more children are attending schools. On the other hand, this increase in attendance 
may affect quality of education. Knowing that public investment in education is a continuous process in 
Brazil, it is important to understand whether Brazil’s educational spending on public primary schools 
resulted in better quality of education. This paper sheds new light on the educational quality literature by 
estimating more accurate econometric models that address endogeneity. 
3. FUNDEF 
The system that finances education in Brazil is very complex; various funds work together, a large 
combination of taxes are used to accumulate resources, and resource allocation is based on multiple 
criteria. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, a narrowed approach is presented focusing only on 
Fundef, which is only part of the total expenditures on education in Brazil. Fundef was chosen because it 
was the main source of education public spending during the period of study. To illustrate, after 
calculation based on data from the National Department of Treasury (2016), we found that Fundef 
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represented 63 per cent of the total municipal primary education spending in 2005. The 1988 Brazilian 
Constitution mandated Fundo de Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e da Valorização do Magistério 
(Fundef), which was enacted in December of 1996 (Law number 9.424). Implementation began in 1998, 
lasting until 2006.  
In Brazil, the K-12 system (educação básica) is divided into two levels. The primary school (ensino 
fundamental) corresponds to grades one to nine, and the high school (ensino médio) corresponds to 
grades 10 to 12. Fundef resources were targeted only to primary schools. In 2007, Fundef was replaced by 
the Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica e de Valorização dos Profissionais da 
Educação (Fundeb), an expanded version of the former. Fundeb is expected to end in 2020, and its 
resources are being targeted to both primary and high schools. 
In 1998, when Fundef started to be implemented, every Brazilian state had to gather 15 per cent 
of the total revenue from each municipality to put in one state fund for education. By doing that, an 
educational fund for every state in Brazil was created. Each municipality received a quota from the 
educational state fund, equivalent to the number of students enrolled in their public schools (that is, a 
per-student basis). The distribution of this educational fund was based on the total number of students 
enrolled in primary schools in the previous year. Some variations of per student spending occurred, based 
on rural and urban enrolment, and also based the total number of students enrolled in the first half (that 
is, grades one to four) and in the second half (that is, grades five to nine) of primary school.  
Table 2 shows the weights used by the federal government to allocate resources. Weights were 
given to each student enrolled in primary school, and varied depending on her/his location (rural or urban) 
and her/his grade of enrolment. Students enrolled in the second half of primary school and located in 
rural areas received more funding, as did students enrolled in special education. These weights are 
included in the simulated instrumental variable.  
[Table 2 about here] 
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In addition, the federal government annually established a minimum amount of funding to be 
allocated per student. This minimum also varied, depending on location (rural or urban) and grade of 
enrolment. The federal government contributed to the educational state funds as well, ensuring that a 
minimum per student spending was reached in every state. Table 3 depicts the minimum amount of 
spending per student. One can observe that the minimum per student spending had an increase of around 
34 per cent from 2003 to 2005; all values were deflated to the year 2005. 
[Table 3 about here] 
In summary, Fundef’s goal was to produce a more equitable and decentralized educational 
system. As described by Dickovick and Eaton (2013), Fundef was an effort “to cut out the state level in 
favour of direct and unintermediated links between the centre and local institutions or individual citizens” 
(p. 1458). However, as indicated by Davies (2006), the tax inequality that existed between the different 
levels of governments in Brazil inhibited the formation of an efficient system of education based on 
spending with consistent standards and quality. 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focuses on work related to educational spending in Brazil, and other studies 
that also included Fundef and Prova Brasil in their models.  
As Schleicher and Tang (2015) explained, there is a counter intuitive threshold amount for 
educational spending per student and quality of learning outcomes. In countries that invest less than USD 
50,000 per student between the ages of six and 15, a significant positive relationship between spending 
per student and quality of education can be observed. For countries that invest USD 50,000 or more per 
student, this relationship cannot be observed. For these countries, the authors explained: increasing 
quality of education is not about how much to invest, but how to spend the resources (p. 13).  For the 
Brazilian case, taking into account averages in 2007, approximately USD 12,000 were spent per student 
between the ages of six and 15. This amount increased to USD 21,000 in 2010. These statistics indicate 
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that one should expect a positive relationship between spending per student and quality of education in 
Brazil. These 2007 and 2010 values were gathered from the Observatório do Plano Nacional de Educação. 
Annual public spending per student was used for these calculations and required using dollar exchange 
rates and controlling for inflation.  
 A few prior studies also examined Fundef using regression models, though in different ways from 
the present study. Focusing on the evolution of public expenditure on education in Brazil during 1991-
2002, Mello and Hoppe (2005) tested if Fundef had a significant impact on net enrolment rates. They 
found that primary and lower-secondary education enrolment increased, particularly in small 
municipalities, proving that Fundef improved the supply side of education in Brazil. The authors 
emphasised the need to place attention on policies to improve the quality of services. However, it should 
be noted that in their methodology, endogeneity was not addressed.  
 Moreover, Gordon and Vegas (2005) estimated various regression models, including an 
instrumental variable to capture mandated spending. They found that increased spending from Fundef 
was associated with smaller class sizes and small gains in enrolment. Conversely, they found no evidence 
that it improved school performance for most students, except perhaps for low-achieving and non-white 
students. Finally, in a study using 1998 Fundef data, Menezes-Filho and Pazello (2007) found that, overall, 
increases in teacher salaries due to Fundef did little to improve performance in public schools. However, 
these raises did attract better new teachers to some schools, and students of these teachers did have 
improved proficiency. In their methodology they did include an instrumental variable, not related to 
Fundef, but to teachers’ salary. 
Our methodology addresses Fundef-related endogeneity by including an instrumental variable in 
the regression model. This instrumental variable estimated in this study follows Kosec’s (2014) 
methodology. Her regressions were used to examine factors that lead to public and private education 
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provision. Kosec also included both Prova Brasil and Fundef in her models. Kosec found “no evidence that 
the quality of public education suffers due to [...] lower propensity to invest” (p. 335).   
As explained above, Prova Brasil is used as a proxy for quality of education in this study. Hanushek 
and Wößmann (2007) recommended that quality of education should be measured by standardized test 
scores. In their literature review, they found that higher performance on tests translated to increased 
earnings, especially in the developing world. They also suggested that school performance cannot be 
solely attributed to test scores since factors like family background and living conditions also have an 
impact. Their main argument is that these scores have significant implications for the economic 
performance of the students, and for the countries that provided their education. 
Finally, Ferraz, Finan and Moreira (2012) also used both Prova Brasil and Fundef in their models 
to understand the relationship between corruption and school performance in primary public schools in 
Brazil. They constructed a variable, “involving educational block grants transferred from the central 
government to municipalities” (p. 712). By using this variable, the effects of corruption in education 
became exogenous. The authors found that Fundef was being misused by several Mayors, e.g., by stealing 
teacher salaries. Additionally, they found a significant negative association between corruption and school 
performance by estimating an OLS and a non-linear Tobit models.  
In summary, based on the literature review, we would expect a positive relationship between test 
scores and educational spending. Moreover, we would expect that the inclusion of the instrumental 
variable would make our regressions more accurate.  
5. DATA AND MODELS 
In this section we present the data used in the models, a description of how the simulated variable 
was  estimated, and the models’ specifications.  
5.1 Data 
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 The data used in this article came from various sources. Table 4 describes all the variables used in 
the models. Some variables were collected at the school level and others at the municipal level. The 
dependent variables – average Prova Brasil scores – were obtained from the Insitituto Nacional de Estudos 
e Pesquisas Educacionais Anisio Texeira (INEP). Prova Brasil started in 2005 and is administered by the 
Ministry of Education every two years. Prova Brasil is a vertically scaled type of test, allowing changes over 
time to be measured. Tests are designed based on the Item Response Theory, which allows the level of 
difficulty for questions to change according to the test taker response. Consequently, it is possible to link 
spending with quality of education over time, when using Prova Brasil as a proxy for quality of education. 
In 2005, the test was administered in public schools located in urban areas that had a minimum of 20 
students per grade. In 2007 and 2009, it was administered in public schools located in urban and rural 
areas that had a minimum of 30 students per grade. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The objective of Prova Brasil is to assess student proficiency in math and Portuguese for grades 4 
and 8. Average scores for the four tests were used as dependent variables. It was expected that the four 
dependent variables would have the same relationships to the independent variables of interest, 
regardless of the differences subject matter and grade level. The independent variable of interest was the 
amount of public spending on primary education in a municipality divided by the total number of students 
enroled in primary schools in that municipality (Fundef). Data on public education spending was obtained 
from the National Department of the Treasury. Natural logarithms were applied to the dependent and 
independent variables of interest to allow for the measurement of elasticity. By doing that, it was possible 
to capture how a change of one per cent in the independent variable would affect the dependent variable.  
A span of two years was used between the dependent variable and independent variable of 
interest as an attempt to allow for any time lag necessary for financial resources to start producing results. 
Specifically, the dependent variable 2005 Prova Brasil had the independent variable 2003 Fundef in its 
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regression; the 2007 Prova Brasil had 2005 Fundef; and the 2009 Prova Brasil had 2006 Fundef, the fund’s 
final year.  
Various control variables were also included in the models. These were found based on an 
extensive literature review examining student proficiency (Hanushek, Lavy & Hitomi, 2006; Kilkenny & 
Haddad, 2008; Menezes-Filho, 2007; Paes de Barros & Mendonça, 1998). These control variables were 
divided into four groups: student, school, teacher, and municipality. Characteristics of students who took 
Prova Brasil were obtained from INEP. The School Census was used to get data for the characteristics of 
schools and teachers in each municipality. Municipal characteristics came from the following sources: GDP 
per capita came from IBGE; and income and health indices were calculated by the Federation of Industries 
of the State of Rio de Janeiro. The income index included average wage, and formal employment; and the 
health index included number of pre-natal and infant deaths. 
The number of observations displayed on Table 4 varied within a source, and also from source to 
source. For instance, the number of schools that participated in the Prova Brasil 2005 math test for grade 
four was 29,072, and in the 2009 test this number was 43,581. It should be noted that all different sources 
had missing values, varying from variable to variable, and also from year to year. After merging these 
different data sets, every school was included in the econometric analysis even when having missing 
values. In other words, the data used in the analysis depicts unbalanced panels. The total number of 
observations included in the regressions are displayed in tables 7 and 8 below. For the regressions without 
the instrumental variable, the total number of schools for grade four was 46,514 and the total number of 
schools for the grade eight was 33,735. For the regressions with the instrumental variable, the total 
number of schools for grade four was 34,102 and the total number of schools for the grade eight was 
25,472.    
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Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the four dependent variables (at the school level), and 
the independent variable of interest (at the municipal level). There was a consistent increase, from 2005 
to 2009, on the average score for math grade four, and Portuguese grades 4 and 8. The average for public 
spending in education also increased from 2003 to 2006.    
[Table 5 about here] 
Table 6 depicts a correlation matrix including the dependent variable ‘math grade 4,’ Fundef and 
all control variables for 104,432 schools (29,072 schools in 2005, 37,483 in 2007, and 43,581 in 2009). In 
general, variables presented expected signs. For instance, the Pearson coefficient between ‘math grade 
4’ and ‘students with internet at home’ is 0.54, indicating that higher socio-economic level is correlated 
with higher test scores. These descriptive results deserve additional examination, motivating our 
investigation to better understand the causal explanation between quality of education and educational 
spending in Brazil. 
[Table 6 about here] 
5.2 The Instrumental Variable 
The Fundef implementation began in 1998, and the transferring of resources used for that year 
was based on the 1997 enrolment data from the School Census. Therefore, to simulate the instrumental 
variable, the 1997 School Census data were used. Additionally, the simulated instrumental variable was 
constructed by combining the following data: the amount of public spending on primary education in a 
municipality; and the total enrolment differentiated by location (that is, urban or rural), by grade (that is, 
from grades one to nine), and by public jurisdiction (that is, municipal or state-based). These data were 
gathered from the National Department of the Treasury and the School Census, respectively.   
The 1997 enrolment data is constant in the 2003, 2005 and 2006 instrumental variables, allowing 
us to control for possible municipal manipulation in enrolment. As a result, our instrumental variable 
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captured exogenous information excluding municipalities’ reaction facing the new Fundef rules. In other 
words, our regressions allowed controlling for any municipal attempt to manipulate enrolment numbers 
to increase Fundef resources to their public schools. Kosec (2014) developed this simulated instrumental 
variable to overcome the fact that possible municipal manipulation in enrolment could occur.  
The exogeneity of the simulated instrument is an important part of our methodology, and a 
detailed explanation about it follows. Although in Brazil there are mechanism in place to minimize 
corruption (Sugiyama, 2016), it is still embedded in municipal governments’ behaviour (Ferraz & Finan 
2011, Ferraz, Finan & Moreira 2012, Timmons & Garfias 2015). For instance, corruption schemes in 
Brazilian municipalities were examined by Ferraz and Finan (2011). They found that Mayors allocated 
funds that were supposed to be for education projects “toward the purchase of cars, fuel, apartments, or 
payment of their friends’ salaries” (p. 1281). Knowing that corruption influences the work environment of 
public employees in Brazil, it would be expected that municipalities could increase their number of 
students enrolled by, for instance, double counting students, and/or using students’ names that do not 
exist. In other words, public official could take advantage of such situation to get more Fundef funding to 
its municipal budget, trapping the federal allocation system.  
As explained above, the federal government used weights to allocate resources. To simulate the 
instrumental variable, enrolment data per school were divided in three groups: grades one to four, grades 
five to nine, and special education students. The three school enrolment groups were then separated in 
sub-groups based on location (rural or urban) and on administrative entity (municipal or state-based). 
Finally, we aggregated the sub-group school enrolments to obtain the total enrolment by municipality and 
individual states, both needed to simulate the instrumental variable. Every sub-group had a weight based 
on Fundef rules, as displayed in Table 2.  
The federal government allocated resources to each state. In turn, each state redistributed its 
resources to its municipalities. Because of the federal government’s weighting system, municipalities with 
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similar enrolment in primary public schools had different amounts of Fundef funds allocated. This situation 
caused variability in the simulated instrumental variable. This variability is required to identify the effect 
of Fundef funds on quality of education. In the simulation process of the instrumental variable, the 
estimated public spending on primary education was used. This public spending was estimated using 1997 
enrolment data, as a constant across time, to capture municipal pre law behaviour. Afterwards, weights 
(see Table 2) were applied to the constant enrolment data to obtain the Fundef distribution coefficient, 
which was then multiplied by the 1998 Fundef funds.          
5.3 Model Specification 
The main goal of this econometric approach is to examine the relationship between quality of 
education and government spending on education in Brazilian public schools during the period 2003-2009. 
Because the law that dictates government spending on education changed during this period, 
endogeneity becomes an issue, since the law induced endogenous municipal attempts to manipulate 
enrolment numbers. As stated above, two panel regression models were estimated: one without the 
simulated instrumental variable, and the other with the simulated instrumental variable. By estimating 
both models, it is possible to compare results and to examine how much endogeneity altered those 
results.  
Our panel regression models allow for controlling unobserved school characteristics that were 
fixed over time, and could have influenced Prova Brasil average scores. Examples of these characteristics 
could be: school programs that motivate reading, community engagement in early childhood education, 
and the quality of school management. 
This study applies the fixed effect panel technique, which includes unobserved school 
characteristics that are fixed over time, and could influence Prova Brasil average scores. This technique 
can be used to obtain consistent estimators in the presence of omitted variables. Examples of these 
characteristics could be: public policies that motivate reading, community engagement in early childhood 
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education, the presence of NGOs that have a strong capacity to be engaged in educational debates, the 
quality of school management, and other social factors that may influence average scores in some way. 
For instance, an important unobserved characteristic such as quality of school management may or may 
not be correlated with Fundef funds.  Assuming that school management is fixed over time, by using this 
technique, it is possible to control for these managerial characteristics. Therefore, estimated results will 
be unbiased.  
The model specification without the simulated instrumental variable is represented in equation 
1.  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 +
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                                                                         (1) 
where Yit is the natural log of the students' average score in Prova Brasil (math grade four, Portuguese 
grade4, math grade 8, Portuguese grade 8); β0 is the constant of the model; Fundefit-2, is the natural log of 
the amount spent on primary education divided by total enrolment in primary education, representing 
the explanatory variable of interest; Studentit is the vector of control variables with characteristics of the 
students who took Prova Brasil Schoolit-2 is the vector of control variables with characteristics of public 
schools; Teacherit-2 is the vector of control variables with characteristics of public school teachers; 
Municipalityit-2 is the vector of control variables with socio-economic characteristics of municipalities; Ci 
corresponds to the specific (fixed) effects of each municipality; β1 to β5 are the unknown parameters to 
be estimated; and Uit is the error term. 
The simulation of the instrumental variable had two steps. The first was the computation of 
Fundef distribution coefficient, represented in equation 2: 
𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖  = ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑒𝑒,1997,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡∈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑒𝑒,1997,𝑡𝑡+ ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒,1997,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡∈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡∈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚∈𝑒𝑒                                                                 (2) 
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where, 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is the Fundef distribution coefficient; 𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆 represent all enrolment types (that is., grade 
one-four urban, grades one to four rural, grades five to nine urban, grades five to nine rural, special 
education); 𝑆𝑆 is the year; 𝑗𝑗 is the enrolment type; 𝐹𝐹 is the weight based on the enrolment type (see Table 
2); 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚,𝑒𝑒,1997,𝑗𝑗 is the total number of students enrolled in 1997, in municipal primary schools in 
municipality 𝑚𝑚, in enrolment type 𝑗𝑗; and 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒,1997,𝑗𝑗 is the total number of students enrolled in 1997 in 
state primary schools, in enrolment type 𝑗𝑗. 
The final step was the simulation of the instrumental variable, represented in equation 3:  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹1998                                                                                                                (3) 
where 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖  is the instrumental variable to be estimated; and 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹1998 is the 1998 Fundef 
transfer.  
 However, if a state did not have revenues for the minimum funding per student, then the federal 
government would transfer funds to that state in order to achieve that minimum, and the instrumental 
variable equation follows in equation four: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚,𝑒𝑒,1997,𝑗𝑗 𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖                                                                                                 (4) 
where  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 is the instrumental variable to be estimated; 𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 é is the minimum value per 
student in the enrolment type  𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑆𝑆; and the other is defined as above. 
The second panel specification including the instrumental variable Fundef_IV (2SLS), the 
independent variable of interest, is represented in equations five and six, as follow:  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                               First Stage             (5) 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 +
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                             Second Stage        (6) 
where all elements are defined as previously.  
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The estimations were made using the statistical software Stata 13. The use of fixed effects for the 
regressions was based on both the Breush and Pagan (1980) and Hausman (1978) tests.  The Breush Pagan 
test indicated that the null hypothesis of non existence of specific effects should be rejected.  Instead, 
there were unobserved fixed effects in the dataset for both panels.  Likewise, the Hausman test showed 
that the fixed effects were better specifications than the random effects for the dataset used in this study 
(see Table 7). 
6. Estimation Results and Discussion 
The results for the panel regressions presented in this section were estimated using school fixed 
effects. In the estimations, clustered robust standard errors and school clusters were used. Table 7 
presents results of the estimation without including the simulated instrumental variable, creating a 
baseline for comparison. Fundef is the independent variable of interest. Each column in Table 7 represents 
a regression for a different dependent variable, i.e. Prova Brasil average score for math grade 4, 
Portuguese grade 4, math grade 8, and Portuguese grade 8. The regression for math grade 4 has 104,432 
schools, for Portuguese grade 4 has 105,163 schools, for math grade 8 has 77,741 schools, and for 
Portuguese grade 8 has 77,740 schools.  
[Table 7 here]  
Results from this table give weak support to our hypothesis: municipalities that received higher 
government spending on primary education had higher Prova Brasil scores. One can observe that an 
increase of 1 per cent in public spending on education would produce an increase of 0.04, 0.003 and 0.01 
for ‘math grade 4,’ ‘Portuguese grade 4,’ and ‘Portuguese grade 8,’ respectively. These elasticities were 
statistically significant at 1 per cent, but had very small magnitude, indicating little impact of public 
spending on student scores. On the other hand, the coefficient for ‘Fundef’ was not statistically significant 
for ‘math grade 8,’ indicating no impact of public spending on student scores.  
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The four models displayed on Table 7 had control variables for student, school, teachers, and 
municipal characteristics. When focusing on the student-related control variables, scores were higher in 
schools with higher proportion of students who had internet at home, for all tests, at 1 per cent level of 
significance. These findings suggest that the higher the economic status of students, the higher their 
scores. With regards to working conditions, results suggest that the scores of ‘students who were working’ 
were significantly reduced for all tests, at 1 per cent level of significance. ‘Mother’s education’ had a 
positive significant relationship with all tests, at 1 per cent, suggesting that the higher the level of the 
mother’s education, the higher the chance of children doing better in school.  
For school related control variables, the estimated effect of ‘computers per school’ on test scores 
was positive and statistically significant  for ‘math grade 4,’ ‘Portuguese grade 4,’ and ‘Portuguese grade 
8,’ at 1 per cent, and for ‘math 8’ the level of significance 10 per cent. Proficiency was higher in ‘schools 
with libraries’ for the ‘math grade4,’ ‘Portuguese grade 4,’ and ‘Portuguese grade 8,’ at 1 per cent. These 
results indicate that school resources, such as the existence of libraries, were important for improving 
scores. The estimated effect of ‘students per classroom’ on test scores was negative and statistically 
significant for ‘math grade 4,’ ‘Portuguese grade 4,’ and ‘math grade 8’ at 1 per cent level of significance. 
This indicates that in the Brazilian context, smaller class sizes lead to improved test scores. Considering 
teacher related control variables, the estimated coefficient for ‘teacher education’ was positive and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent for ‘math grade 4,’ ‘Portuguese grade 4,’ and ‘Portuguese grade 8’ 
tests, demonstrating that teachers with higher levels of education benefit students.   
With regards to the municipality related control variables, the natural log of ‘GDP per capita’ was 
statistically significant and positively related to ‘math grade 4,’ ‘Portuguese grade 4,’ and ‘math grade 8,’ 
at 1 per cent level of significance. The ‘health index’ was statistically significant and positively associated 
with all test scores at 1 per cent. The ‘income index’ was statistically significant and positively associated 
‘math grade 4,’ but was negatively associated with ‘Portuguese grade 4,’ ‘math grade 8’ and ‘Portuguese 
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grade 8,’ all at 1 per cent. In summary, there was consistent significance with the direction of the ‘GDP 
per capita’ and ‘health index’ coefficients. On the other hand, there was no consistent significance with 
the direction of the ‘income index’ coefficients. 
Knowing that municipalities may have attempted to manipulate enrolment numbers to increase 
Fundef resources to their public schools, a simulated instrumental variable was introduced to the 
regression analysis. Table 8 presents results of the fixed effects estimation including the simulated 
instrumental variable. The regression for math grade 4 has 91,918 schools, for Portuguese grade 4 has 
92,679 schools, for math grade 8 has 69,390 schools, and for Portuguese grade 8 has 69,398 schools. One 
can observe that there was a decrease in the number of schools for these regressions. This happened 
because we used 1997 data to estimate the instrumental variable; in 1997 there were 4,491 municipalities 
in the country. The number of municipalities increased by 1,018 municipalities in 2000, totalling 5,509 
municipalities in the country.  This change in the number of municipalities is the reason for the decreased 
in schools in the instrumental variable regressions.  To illustrate, a municipality that did not exist in 1997 
could not be included in these regressions because it would not have available enrolment data to estimate 
the instrumental variable. 
In these regressions, endogeneity was controlled, allowing for a more accurate approach to test 
our hypothesis. The coefficients for ‘Fundef’ were positive and significant for ‘math grade 4,’ and 
‘Portuguese grade 8’ at 1 per cent level of significance, and ‘Portuguese grade 4’ at 10 per cent of 
significance. For these three tests there was a coincidence of higher scores and higher spending in 
education. The magnitude of these coefficients increased by 250 per cent, 320 per cent and 66 per cent 
respectively, showing that investments in education had some positive effects on test scores. For instance, 
a 1 per cent increase in Fundef allocation would increase score in math grade four by 0.15 per cent and in 
‘Portuguese grade 4’ by 0.005, and grade eight by 0.05 per cent.  
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In summary, our empirical strategy to examine the exogenous effect of Fundef on student 
performance considered the control of observable variables, school fixed effects, and a simulated 
instrumental variable for Fundef. First, our regressions included control variables, based on the literature, 
for important characteristics of students, schools, teachers and municipalities. Second, our panel 
regression models allowed for controlling unobserved school characteristics that were fixed over time, 
such as public policies that motivate reading, community engagement in early childhood education, and 
other social factors that may influence average scores in some way. Then, the control observable variables 
and the control of school fixed effects enable us to capture important information that could bias our 
instrumental variable if they were omitted. Both play an important part in supporting the exogeneity of 
our simulated instrumental variable. Our simulated instrumental variable captured exogenous 
information excluding municipalities’ reaction facing new Fundef rules. In other words, this simulated 
variable overcame the fact that possible municipal manipulation in enrolment could occur.  
Based on these findings, the hypothesis about municipalities that received higher government 
spending on primary education had higher Prova Brasil scores was weakly supported. The magnitudes of 
the coefficients were larger when the instrumental variable was included; however, they were still very 
small. Concerning the control variables, results displayed in Table 8 were consistent with the results from 
Table 7. Therefore, the discussion presented above holds for both tables. 
[Table 8 about here] 
 7.  Conclusion 
The main objective of this study was to examine whether Brazil’s educational spending on public 
primary schools during the period 2003-2009 resulted in better quality of education. Panel data using 
school fixed effects, including clustered robust standard errors, and controlling for endogeneity was used 
for the dataset analysed in this study. The dependent variable was average test scores on Prova Brasil, 
which were used as a proxy for quality of education. There was one independent variable of interest: the 
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amount of public spending on primary education in a municipality divided by number of students enrolled 
in primary education in that municipality. A span of two years was applied between the dependent and 
independent variable as an attempt to capture any time lag required for financial resources to begin 
working.  
Six regressions indicated that municipalities characterized by higher Prova Brasil scores were 
receiving higher government spending on education, except for the ‘math grade 8’ regressions. The 
magnitude of all significant estimated coefficients increased when controlling for endogeneity – using the 
simulated instrumental variable – but were still very small in magnitude. Our hypothesis, that is, 
municipalities that received higher government spending on primary education had higher Prova Brasil 
scores was weakly supported by six out of eight regressions.  
Even so, these findings proved that the relationship between quality of education and public 
spending was not optimal, mainly because of the small magnitude of the estimated coefficients. This 
indicates that public spending in education only weakly contributed to the formation of human capital. 
This study can illustrate what Hanushek (2013) referred to as “less successful” human capital development 
because of the “little relationship” found in our estimations (p. 209).  Moreover, these results are 
surprising if one considers Schleicher and Tang’s (2015). They state that countries that invest less than 
USD 50,000 per student between the ages of six and 15, should have a significant positive relationship 
between spending per student and quality of education. During the period of study Brazil invested less 
than USD 50,000 per student between the ages of six and 15, putting the country in the optimal range.   
The economic growth that Brazil was experiencing from 2003 to 2013 should have been followed 
by steady human capital formation. Issues such as political factors, corruption, lack of efficiency, and 
quality of investments could be explanations for the small magnitude of the estimated coefficients. So 
what should be done to ensure that investments in education contribute to human capital formation? 
Hanushek (2013) recommended that “slowing the pace of the provision of schools to a rate that also permits 
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the development of quality schools appears to be a good solution” (p. 211), for developing countries. In 
other words, funding five schools to improve quality before funding additional schools would be better 
for human capital formation than funding ten schools simultaneously when facing scarce public resources. 
If Brazilian policy makers had focused funding at the beginning of Fundef on a few schools, and had 
gradually expanded the funds to more schools, then the results might have been more robust.  
Moreover, there are various innovative initiatives being implemented and tested in different 
regions around the world to hasten the ‘development of quality schools.’ To illustrate, third graders are 
learning mathematics with songs and games in Paraguay. According to the NGO Innovation for Poverty 
Action (2013) “results show children in Big Math schools improved their math skills over the five months 
of the program as much as other accepted education programs” (p. 12). Additionally, in India, children 
facing lower performance in basic literacy and numerical skills are working together with community 
assistants to improve the children’s performance (Innovation for Poverty Action, 2012). Brazilian policy 
makers should explore successful initiatives like these to improve the level of efficiency and the quality of 
educational investments. By doing that, Fundeb, the current educational fund, could contribute to the 
quality of Brazilian public schools, in a more effective and efficient manner. 
Some of the potential limitations of this study follow.  First, it is important to highlight that the 
regressions estimated in this paper only captured part of the variation in education spending in Brazil 
between 2003 and 2009, due to the fact Fundef only accounts for part of the total spending. Second, larger 
time spans between the independent and dependent variables could capture time lags that are required 
for financial resources to start working more effectively. However, data availability did not allow for larger 
spans in this study. Third, understating how municipalities spent their Fundef resources would help 
elucidate the complex educational funding system and its effects on test scores. For instance, a 
municipality could have allocated 50 per cent of Fundef resources in buying books for all its libraries; 
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whereas, another municipality could have allocated the same amount in developing an after school 
program. However, data availability did not allow for such type of analysis.   
Future research should focus on issues related to improving public school quality in Brazil. From 
a qualitative perspective, for instance, examining how institutional capacity varies between public schools 
could help better understand the variation on Prova Brasil scores. Another research topic could compare 
public and private schools, focusing on the similarities and differences on how they allocate resources. As 
Gradin (2009) alerted, in the Brazilian context, public schools “typically provide education of lower 
quality” (p. 1443), making this comparison an interesting applied study. Additionally, the econometric 
approach could benefit by developing the Conley, Hansen & Rossi (2012) bounding method for panel data 
in order to test for plausible exogeneity. 
From a quantitative perspective, institutional capacity could be evaluated by building a variable 
based on educational management characteristics. Another research idea could be a longitudinal study 
comparing public and private schools, and using data from other sources such as SAEB or Geres Project. 
In this latter idea, the control of fixed effects should also be included, but an important future step could 
be the use of data at the individual level. This would make possible to control for school fixed effects and 
pupil fixed effects simultaneously. 
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Table 1: Comparing Economic Growth, Quality of Education, and Educational Spending, 2006-2009. 
 
 Year Chile Argentina Colombia Brazil Mexico 
PISA Math 
2006 411 381 370 370 406 
2009 496 388 381 386 419 
Change ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
PISA Reading 
2006 442 374 385 393 410 
2009 449 398 413 412 425 
Change ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Annual % 
change in GDP 
2006 4.4 8.4 6.7 4.0 5.0 
2007 5.2 8.0 6.9 6.0 3.1 
2008 3.3 3.1 3.5 5.0 1.4 
2009 -1.0 0.1 1.7 -0.2 -4.7 
Change ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Public spending 
on education in 
% of GDP 
2006 3.0 3.7 3.9 5.0 4.7 
2007 3.2 3.9 4.1 5.1 4.7 
2008 3.8 4.3 3.9 5.4 4.9 
2009 4.2 4.9 4.7 5.6 5.2 
Change ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 




Table 2. Weights used for FUNDEF allocation based on enrolment type 
Enrolment type 2003 2005 2006 
1 to 4 grade Urban 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 to 4 grade Rural 1.00 1.02 1.02 
5 to 9 grade Urban 1.05 1.05 1.05 
5 to 9 grade Rural 1.05 1.07 1.07 
Special Education 1.07 1.07 1.07 
 





Table 3. Minimum amount to be allocated per student based on FUNDEF 
Minimum amount per 
student 2003 2005 2006 
1 to 4 grade Urban R$462.00 R$620.56 R$682.60 
1 to 4 grade Rural R$462.00 R$632.97 R$696.25 
5 to 9 grade Urban R$485.10 R$651.59 R$716.73 
5 to 9 grade Rural R$485.10 R$664.00 R$730.38 
Special Education R$485.10 R$664.00 R$730.38 
Source: Law number 4,861, October 20,  2003 
Table 4: Description of all Variables 
Variable Years Unit of analysis 
Dependent variables   
Log of Prova Brasil Math average score 
- 4th grade (math grade 4) 2005, 2007, 2009 School 
 Log of Prova Brasil Portuguese 
average score - 4th grade (Portuguese 
grade 4) 
2005, 2007, 2009 School 
Log of Prova Brasil Math average score 
- 8th grade (math grade 8) 2005, 2007, 2009 School  
Log of Prova Brasil Portuguese average 
score - 8th grade (Portuguese grade 8) 2005, 2007, 2009 School  
Independent variable of interest   
Log of Fundef  spending divided by 
number of enrollment in  elementary 
education (Fundef) 
2003, 2005, 2006 Municipality 
Student-related control variables   
Proportion of students who took Prova 
Brasil who lived in a place with internet 
access (‘students with internet at home) 
2005, 2007, 2009 School 
Proportion of students who took Prova 
Brasil and worked (students who were 
working) 
2005, 2007, 2009 School 
Proportion of mothers -of students who 
took Prova Brasil - who attended 4th 
grade or higher (mother’s education)  
2005, 2007, 2009 School 
School-related control variables   
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Binary variable of public schools that 
had a computer lab (computers per 
school) 
2003, 2005, 2007 School 
Binary variable of public schools that 
had a library (school with libraries) 2003, 2005, 2007 School 
Total number of students divided by 
number of classes in elementary 
schools (student per classroom) 
2003, 2005, 2007 School 
Teacher-related control variables   
Proportion of teachers working in public 
schools with undergraduate degree 
(teacher education) 
2003, 2005, 2007 School 
Municipality-related control variables   
Log of GDP per capita (GDP per capita) 2003, 2005, 2007 Municipality 
Health index (health index) 2000, 2005, 2007 Municipality 
Income index (income index) 2000, 2005, 2007      Municipality 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables and Independent Variables of Interest 
2005 
Variable (# Obs) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Math grade 4 (29,072) 5.18 0.101 4.73 5.67 
Portuguese grade 4 
(30,090) 5.14 0.106 4.67 5.67 
Fundef (45,784) 475.7 205.7 -0.145 2,026 
Math grade 8 (22,017) 5.47 0.074 5.15 5.872 
Portuguese grade 8 
(22,017) 5.41 0.072 5.06 5.740 
Fundef (33,618) 478.9 208.2 -0.145 2,027 
2007 
Variable (# Obs) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Math grade 4  (37,483) 5.232 0.107 3.926 5.771 
Portuguese grade 4 
(37,483) 5.135 0.109 4.223 5.567 
Fundef (46,970) 595.6 231.6 0.000 1,861 
Math grade 8 (27,381) 5.471 0.080 4.143 5.901 
Portuguese grade 8 
(27,381) 5.422 0.077 4.939 5.779 
Fundef (34,152) 600.6 236.3 0.000 1,861 
2009 
Variable (# Obs) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Math grade 4 (43,581) 5.275 0.131 4.611 5.766 
Portuguese grade 4 
(43,582) 5.170 0.125 4.531 5.685 
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Fundef (47,259) 702.9 265.8 0.000 2,144 
Math grade 8 (31,963) 5.472 0.087 4.931 5.911 
Portuguese grade 8 
(31,962) 5.457 0.088 4.874 5.818 
Fundef (34,292) 709.8 272.4 0.000 2,144 
 
Source: INEP and Tesouro Nacional. 
Table 6: Correlation Matrix using Math grade 4 as dependent variable 










Teacher   
Math 04 1.000
Fundef 0.177 1.000
Stud. Internet 0.543 0.156 1.000
Stud. Work -0.431 -0.083 -0.335 1.000
Mother edu 0.358 -0.012 0.442 -0.287 1.000
Sch. Computer 0.263 0.096 0.318 -0.168 0.186 1.000
Sch. Library 0.270 0.030 0.231 -0.170 0.171 0.255 1.000
Stu. Classroom -0.109 -0.111 0.122 -0.010 0.102 0.085 -0.040 1.000
Teacher edu 0.403 0.102 0.381 -0.254 0.266 0.306 0.303 0.005 1.000
GDP 0.224 0.028 0.522 -0.262 0.330 0.262 0.122 0.298 0.331
Health Index 0.539 0.185 0.522 -0.336 0.314 0.309 0.253 -0.099 0.506
Income Index 0.336 0.044 0.529 -0.297 0.323 0.266 0.157 0.177 0.362
 
 
 Table 7. Results of natural log of average Prova Brasil scores estimated by fixed-effect panel 
data without simulated instrumental variable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables Math 4 Portuguese 4 Math 8 Portuguese 8 
Independent variable  
of interest        
Fundef 0.045*** 0.003** -0.001 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Student related  
control variables    
Student with internet at home 0.137*** 0.063*** 0.044*** 0.081*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Student who were working -0.173*** -0.179*** -0.064*** -0.117*** 
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 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Mother’s education 0.096*** 0.112*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
School related  
control variables 
Computers per school 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.001* 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Schools with libraries 0.009*** 0.014*** -0.001* 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Students per classroom -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Teacher related  
control variables    
Teacher’s education 0.036*** 0.016*** -0.003* 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Municipality related  
control variables    
Ln GDP 0.096*** 0.086*** 0.002 0.067*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Health Index 0.154*** 0.032*** 0.019*** 0.080*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Income Index 0.042*** -0.035*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Constant 3.429*** 3.881*** 5.394*** 4.318*** 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.018) (0.022) 
     
Observations 104,432 105,163 77,741 77,740 
R-square within 0.4255 0.2292 0.0535 0.3353 
R-square between 0.137 0.1643 0.2536 0.1072 
R-square overall 0.1233 0.136 0.2234 0.0973 
Breusch-Pagan χ²(01) 8,872 9,163 10,871 7,149 
Hausman χ²(11) 6,611 7,042 7,669 4,082 
Number of schools 46,514 46,527 33,735 33,735 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests were 
estimated without considering school clusters. 
Table 8. Results of natural log of average Prova Brasil scores estimated by fixed-effect panel data with 
simulated instrumental variable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables Math 4 Portuguese 4 Math 8 Portuguese 8 
Independent variables  
of interest        
Fundef 0.158*** 0.005* -0.004 0.059*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
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Student related  
control variables    
Stududent with Internet at 
home 0.115*** 0.063*** 0.044*** 0.075*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Students who were working -0.149*** -0.178*** -0.065*** -0.107*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Mother’s education 0.099*** 0.112*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
School related  
control variables 
Computers per school 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.001* 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
School with libaries 0.010*** 0.014*** -0.001* 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Students per classroom -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Teacher related  
control variables    
Teach_edu 0.022*** 0.016*** -0.002 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Municipality related 
control variables    
Ln GDP 0.041*** 0.085*** 0.004* 0.047*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Health Index 0.070*** 0.030*** 0.021*** 0.045*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Income Index 0.015*** -0.036*** -0.006*** -0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Observations 91,918 92,679 69,390 69,389 
R-square within 0.3741 0.2292 0.0533 0.3141 
R-square between 0.1576 0.1644 0.2249 0.1168 
R-square overall 0.1739 0.1362 0.196 0.1154 
Hausmann χ²(11) 20,052 8,063 5,918 53,170 
Number of schools 34,102 34,145 25,472 25,472 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Hausman test was estimated without 
considering school clusters. 
 
 
 
 
